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Most labour market analyses take money wages as the sole measure of compensation 
for labour, thus excluding fringe benefits. We examine an extended compensation 
measure by incorporating mandatory collective earnings-related insurance rights: the 
rights of individual old age pension, sickness benefit insurance and survivors’ 
pension. We estimate the return on investment in human capital and the gender 
earnings gap in a traditional earnings equation. The money wage and the extended 
wage are used as dependent variables in joint regressions, where a SUR framework 
enables proper joint cross-equation tests. The main finding is that the inclusion of 
earnings-related insurance rights does affect the return on education. When these 
non-wage benefits are included, the gender wage gap decreases by 21 per cent. 
However, the gender differences in returns to education are severely underestimated 
when money wage is used as a compensation measure.  
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Traditional studies of wage differentials do not provide us with the 
complete picture of differences in remuneration for work. One reason is 
that compensation other than money wages is not included. This can result 
in misjudged wage differences, since wages are not only money wages. An 
employee’s total labour compensation includes all benefits received in 
connection with his or her employment. In addition to money wage com-
pensation may include earnings-related (employment-related) insurance 
rights, conventional fringe benefits, working conditions, promotion oppor-
tunities, employment security, etc. 
In this study of 1995 year’s wage differentials in Sweden we use an 
extended earnings measure. In addition to money wage, old age pension 
rights, survivors’ pension rights and sickness benefit insurance rights 
derived from the occupational and earnings-related social insurance 
schemes are included in the wage measure. Particular for Sweden is that 
these insurance schemes are mandatory and collective. Since they are not 
marketable (on the individual level) we cannot directly observe the indi-
vidual value of the non-wage benefit that the security package represents. 
Instead, the non-wage benefits have to be determined by indirect means. 
In the study we analyse how the inclusion of earnings-related insurance 
rights in the earnings equation changes the returns on human capital and 
affect the gender earnings gap. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section I gives the introduction. 
Section II presents previous studies. In section III data is presented and the 
individual non-wage benefit of the security in times of old age, 
widow/widowerhood and sickness is estimated. Section IV presents the 
econometric specifications, sample and variables. Section V contains empi-
rical results. Conclusions and reflections are given in the final Section VI. 
 
 
II. Previous studies 
 
In most studies and comparisons of earnings inequality, the money wage is 
used as the measure of labour compensation, although in fact a broader 
measure should be used. Only a few empirical studies have been made of 
the role of non-wage benefits in the distribution of earnings. Townsend 
(1979) shows that conventional fringe benefits reinforce the inequality in 
earnings distribution between British blue-collar and white-collar workers.  
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Atkinson (1983, p. 81) reports similar findings. Smeeding (1983) suggests 
that if measures of the non-cash compensation normally enjoyed by high-
wage professionals and administrators were included in the analysis, the 
distribution of compensation would appear more unequal. Granqvist (1998) 
using Finnish data finds that conventional fringe benefits increase earnings 
differentials and gender differences in earnings inequality. Using Swedish 
data, Selén and Ståhlberg (1998) find that, according to the coefficient of 
variation, relative variability increases when acquired pension rights are 
included in the wage measure. 
Most empirical findings about the way non-wage benefits affect the 
return on human capital reveal little or no change in the return when non-
wage benefits are included in the earnings measure. However, using micro 
data simulation techniques to construct a data set from grouped US data for 
1980, Smeeding (1983) reports results suggesting that different measures of 
compensation can be expected to have a substantial effect on the previously 
determined impact of various explanatory variables on hourly wages and 
salaries. In a Finnish study, based on micro data for 1987, Asplund (1993) 
shows that when the tax value of conventional fringe benefits is added to 
normal earnings, the estimated wage effects do not differ significantly from 
the wage effects estimated when non-wage benefits are not included. 
Granqvist (1998) using Finnish data finds that the inclusion of fringe 
benefits in the wage measure does affect the gender gap and the return on 
human capital. Kiker and Rhine (1987), using US data, find that the mean 
rate of return on an additional year of work experience is higher for both 
males and females when health insurance are included. Selén and Ståhlberg 
(1996), using Swedish data, find that experience makes a greater impact in 
estimations where the wage concept includes money wage and acquired 
pension rights, than in estimations that consider the money wage only. 
Results presented in Fornwall (1994), also based on Swedish data, indicate 
that the parameter estimate of education and educational achievements 
decreases in size and significance when conventional fringe benefits are 
included in the earnings measure. This, the author concludes, indicates that 
education and educational achievements make a different impact on non-
wage benefits than on salary. 
There are numerous studies of male-female earnings differentials, but 
only a handful has analysed gender differences in non-wage benefits. Most 
of them focus on gender differences in the probability of receiving 
insurance provisions. A number of US studies of non-wage benefits focus 
on gender differences in insurance provisions. Currie (1993) estimates 
linear probability models on the provision of different non-wage benefits. 
She finds that women are less likely to be offered pensions, health coverage  
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and disability plans even after controlling for characteristics like age, 
education, marital status and number of children. Even and Macpherson 
(1990) report that for a given set of observed characteristics a woman is 10-
20 per cent less likely than a man to have a pension benefit. In contrast, 
Averett and Hotchkiss (1995) find that women are more likely to receive 






Our estimation is based on a representative sample of the Swedish adult 
population 18-64 years old. More precisely we employ the household 
income survey for 1995 (Statistics, Sweden). This yearly survey is based on 
about 10 000 households in all. Individuals are interviewed concerning 
labour market status, household structure and housing conditions. The 
interviews are supplemented with register data on income from different 
sources and with other variables. The non-response rate for 1995 was 
below 20 percent. 
 
 
Estimated non-wage benefits 
 
In addition to earnings-related social insurance Sweden has quasi-
mandatory occupational insurance schemes where the mandate is not a 
legal requirement imposed by the state, but the result of contractual 
agreements between labour unions and employers. What is unusual about 
the situation in Sweden is that practically all employees are covered by 
occupational insurance that is drawn up in a very small number of 
occupational schemes. There are four main schemes: one for private sector 
white-collar workers, one for private sector blue-collar workers, one for 
state employees, and one for local authority and county council employees. 
They cover the same areas as the social insurance scheme. They raise the 
level of compensation especially upon illness and retirement. They also 
compensate for loss of income above the level of earnings covered by 
social insurance. In 1995, social and occupational insurance schemes are 
mandatory, encompassing, and non-actuarial (on the individual level). We 
cannot directly observe the individual value of the annual non-wage benefit 
that a mandated collective insurance represents. Instead, it has been 
estimated as follows. 
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Old age pension rights 
In 1995, Sweden had five typical defined benefit pension plans,
4 which 
promise a yearly pension during retirement equal to 
 
B = K ×  TN ×  W 
 
where 
B = annual retirement benefit, 
TN = accumulated years of service at retirement date, 
W = annual salary (usually the terminal salary or the average of the last 
year’s salaries), 
K = a constant. 
 
For each individual in the sample we calculate P, the yearly increase in 
the present value of pension liabilities from employment during the year 





L1 = K ×  T1 ×  W1 
L0 = K ×  T0 ×  W0 
W1 = annual earning (terminal salary or the average of the last year’s 
salaries) at end of year 1 
W0 = annual earning (terminal salary or the average of the last year’s 
salaries) at end of year 0, 
T1 = years of service at end of year 1, 
T0 = years of service at end of year 0 
D = age at death, 
N = age at retirement, 
A = current age (year 1) 
SA,N is the probability of surviving from age A to age N 
r = real rate of discount, r = 0.02. 
                                                            
4 Pension experts usually distinguish between two pension plan types, the defined 
benefit (DB) and the defined contribution (DC) pension. In a DB plan, a formula for 
retirement income based on the worker’s wage and service is specified. In a DC plan, 
benefits at retirement depend on the total contribution the worker has accumulated into 
the plan by retirement age. 
5 See also for example Moore (1987). 
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L1 and L0 have been calculated according to the rules of the five old age 
pension schemes described in Appendix Table A1. 
 
 
Survivors’ pension rights 
We estimate the individual value of the survivors’ pension from the 1995 
occupational insurance schemes and income-related social insurance 






j i i A B p , , Π = + × , that is the expected value of the occupational 
survivors’ pension  for individual i who belongs to the occupational 





i i A B p Π = + × , that is the expected value of the survivors’ pension 
from the earnings-related social insurance system for individual i where 
pi = the probability of the insurance situation occurring, that is, the 
mortality risk. This is calculated by age and sex.  
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j i B B , , = (age, married/cohabitee, annual wages, marginal tax rate, age 
of spouse/cohabitee, mean life expectancy, number of children, children’s 
ages, rate of discount) according to the survivors’ pension rules. Table A2 








i B B = (married/cohabitee, pension points in the earnings-related 
social insurance old age pension scheme, number of years with pension 
points, marginal tax rate, number of children, children’s ages, rate of 
discount) according to the survivors’ pension rules. See Appendix Table 




j A  administrative costs of the occupational insurance scheme j. 
=
Soc A administrative costs of the social insurance scheme. 
0 = =
Soc Occ
j A A  
r = real rate of discount, r = 0.02.  
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Sickness benefit insurance rights 
We estimate the individual value of the income security in times of 
sickness (according to Selén & Ståhlberg 2002). The risk of sickness is 
diversified according to sex, age, socio-economic group, and occupational 
sector. The sickness benefit rules are described in Appendix Table A3. 
For each individual in the sample it would be possible to estimate the 
expected benefits given the expected number of days at each replacement 
level, that is, 
at level A (corresponds to days 2-14 in each sick-period), 
at level B (15-90 days), 
at level C (91-365 days). 
 
This can be done if there is information on 
the probability for 1 day on level A, and for 2 days,..13 days, 14 days, 15 
days …etc 
the probability for 1 day on level B, and for 2 days,..13 days, 14 days, 15 
days…etc 
the probability for 1 day on level C, and for 2 days,..13 days, 14 days, 15 
days…etc. 
 
The expected benefits on level A thus are 
cA× w× (p1A+2× p2A+3× p3A…..), where 
cA is a constant determined by the sickness benefit rules 
piA is the probability for i days on level A 
w is wage income. 
 
Correspondingly, the expected benefits on level B and C are 
cB× w× (p1B+2× p2B+3× p3B…..) 
cC× w× (p1C+2× p2C+3× p3C…..). 
 
That is, we need information of the weighted sum of the probabilities 
(p1A+2× p2A+3× p3A…..), (p1B+2× p2B+3× p3B…..), (p1C+2× p2C+3× p3C…..) 
by occupational sector, socio-economic group, sex and age. 
Instead of pursuing this task, we follow the simpler path of Selén and 
Ståhlberg (2002). This is mainly dictated by the available data, where 
information on sickness periods is lacking and an individual’s sickness 
compensation is known only for days 15 and onwards aggregated over the 
year. The strategy is to non- parametrically estimate sickness behaviour for 
different groups, and calculate the benefits under certain assumptions 
utilising data from 1990 when all sickness compensation was administered 
by the National social administration and therefore centrally registered.  
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Estimates from Selén and Ståhlberg (2002) concerning sickness benefits by 
class, sex and age group cross-classified (cf. table 4.2 ibid.) are imputed to 




IV. Econometric specifications, sample and variables 
 
In the analysis two earnings measures are used: money wage and total 
wage, which includes money wage and the total value of non-wage 
benefits,  W + NWB. The non-wage benefits are those earnings-related 
insurance rights that we described above. The H0-hypothesis to be tested 
states that omitting non-wage benefits from the earnings equation does not 
bias the return on human capital, because a change in the money wage will 
be a good proxy for the change in the total wage. 
In order to test this hypothesis we jointly estimate the two earnings 
equations in a Mincer equation context: the logarithm of money wage and 
the logarithm of total wage. Money wage and non-wage benefits are 
assumed to be related through the disturbance terms for each observation. 
Why should non-wage benefits and money wages be related to each other 
in this way? The reason is that some non-observed characteristics of a 
given employee have similar effects on the disturbances in the money-wage 
equation and in the non-wage/total wage equation. We therefore use a GLS 
estimator to estimate the seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR). 
Above all, using this framework makes joint cross-equation tests 
possible. In a statistical sense it is not adequate to compare coefficients 
from different OLS regressions, if the samples cannot be treated as 
independent samples. However, in this case there are no differences in the 
estimated parameter vectors of using GLS or OLS, because the X vector is 
exactly the same in every equation. Nevertheless the variance-covariance 
matrix  Σ , is different from that of the separate OLS regressions, given that 
the off-diagonal elements are not zero.
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Therefore we first test whether the off-diagonal elements in the variance-
covariance matrix Σ  are zero, i.e. we test for correlation between the 
disturbances in the money-wage equation and the non-wage benefit 
equation. The test statistic used is the Lagrange multiplier statistic, which is 
                                                            
6 Although the well-known mathematical fact that the OLS and GLS estimators are 
similar if the explanatory variables are the same in each equation, we should still 
estimate the model using GLS, because coherent inference can only be drawn using the 
full variance-covariance matrix including the off-diagonal elements (Jäntti, 1994).  
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asymptotically 
2 χ  distributed under H0, as suggested by Breusch and 
Pagan (1980). See Judge et al. (1985, p. 476) for a description of the 
statistic. 
The hypothesis of equal coefficient vectors across equations is tested, 
using the SUR off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix. 
The test statistic is a Wald test statistic (see Judge et al., 1985, pp. 20-28, 
and STATA6 Manual Su-Z, pp. 183-186). 
A sample of 10 897 employees aged 20-60 is used in the analyses. The 
female/male share is 50.6 / 49.4 per cent. The sample means are shown in 
Table 1. The equation used in every regression is an extended Mincer 
equation consisting of traditional human capital variables plus job-related 
characteristics, which are predicted as playing a part in the wage-level 
equation. A gender dummy for women is included. Instead of a continuous 
schooling variable, seven dummy variables are used to indicate the 
educational level with the lowest level as the reference level. Work 
experience is constructed on the basis of earned pension points included in 
the data set. This is a more adequate measure of experience than potential 
experience, which is usually used in earnings equations. Experience 
squared is also included. Six dummy variables indicating sector and socio-
economic class with the private blue-collar group as the reference level are 
included. Dummies for working full time and living in a big city 
(Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö) are included along with variable 
measuring the number of children under 12 years old and a dummy for 
being married. 
Annual before-tax money wage is the basis of the dependent variable 
employed in the regressions. This type of compensation includes overtime 
and holiday pay.
7 The ”total wage” variable is constructed by adding the 
total annual value of non-wage benefits (the sum of the derived values of 
old age pension rights, sickness benefit insurance rights and survivors’ 
pension rights) to the annual money wage. The dependent variables are the 
logarithm of annual money wage and the log of the annual total wage. To 
get an idea of the magnitudes of the non-wage benefit/total-wage ratio and 
non-wage benefit/money-wage ratio in the sample, the shares are shown in 
Table 1. The mean non-wage-benefit/total-wage ratio is about 18 per cent 
and the mean non-wage-benefit/money-wage ratio is about 27 per cent.
8  
                                                            
7 We use annual earnings in stead of hourly earnings because the information on 
working time in the data set is not reliable. The inclusion of a full-time dummy is 
expected to somewhat alleviate this shortcoming. 
8 Some of the derived values of non-wage benefits are negative since L1 can be less than 
L0.  
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Table 1.   Means of variables. Employees aged 20 to 60. Stan-
dard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 All  Female  Male 
      
Income measures:      
Logarithm of annual money wage  12.10 (0.45)  11.92 (0.38)  12.29 (0.44) 
Logarithm of annual total wage  12.33 (0.53)  12.16 (0.45)  12.50 (0.55) 
      












      








2 Non-wage benefits, sickness insurance 
rights (SEK) 
9 933 (4 920)  10509 (4 290)  9 341 (5 428) 
3 Non-wage benefits, survivors’ pension 
(SEK) 
2 950 (3 267)  2 304 (2 133)  3 612 (4 011) 






NWB shares, %:      
NWB / total wage  18.4  19.9  16.9 
NWB / money wage  27.5  28.6  26.3 
NWB, old age pensions / money wage  20.4  20.3  20.6 
NWB, sickness insurance rights / money 
wage 
5.5 6.8  4.2 
NWB, survivors’ pension / money wage  1.5  1.5  1.5 
      
Women, %  50.6     
      
Educational levels, %:      
Primary education, 
less than 9 years 
8.0 6.5  9.4 
Primary education 
9 years (10 years) 
10.4 9.5  11.3 
Upper secondary education,  
2 years 
35.8 38.8  32.7 
Upper secondary education, > 2 years  14.7  12.6  16.8 
University education, less than 3 years  16.2  17.8  14.5 
University 
education, 3 years or more 
14.2 14.3  14.2 
Doctoral education  0.7  0.4  1.1 
      
Work experience, years  19.8 (9.3)  18.7 (8.4)  21.0 (9.9) 
      
Full time, %  68.0  50.1  86.3 
      
 (Table 1 cont.)  
10 
Table 1 (cont.) 
     
Sector and socio-economic class, %:     
Private  
white collar 
32.3 25.2 39.6 
State  
white collar 
6.9 6.6 7.3 
Local authority and county council 
white collar 
18.2 27.1 9.1 
State blue collar  1.7  1.2  2.2 
Local authority and county council 
blue collar 
14.3 23.7 4.6 
Private blue collar  26.5  16.2  37.1 
      
Big city (Stockholm, Gothenburg, 
Malmö), % 
14.6 14.8 14.5 
      
No of children under 12 years old  0.70 (0.97)  0.68 (0.94)  0.72 (0.99) 
      
Married, %  58.9  60.2  57.7 
      
# of observations  10 897  5 517  5 380 
 
The non-wage benefit shares are somewhat higher for women than for men. 
For example, the ratio of average sickness benefit rights to the money wage 
is larger for women than for men since the sickness rate is higher for 
women. The average survivors’ pension rights relative to the money wage 
are the same for women and men, while the average old age pension rights 
relative to money wage is somewhat higher for men.  
To account for structural gender differences each set of equations is 
estimated separately for men and women.
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Table 2.  Correlations between the residuals of the money-wage 
equation and the non-wage-benefit equation. The probability 











  0.62 (pr=0.000)  0.60 (pr=0.000.)  0.63 (pr=0.000) 
                                                            
9 Each set of equations was also estimated separately for the four occupational schemes. 
The results, not presented here, are available upon request. 
10 Note that the number of observations is somewhat smaller than of the sample used in 
the analyses. This is due to negative total values of non-wage-benefits, which we 




Before we analyse the effects of including earnings-related insurance rights 
in the traditional earnings equation, we test the hypothesis of independence. 
To calculate the correlation matrix of the residuals, we estimate a SUR 
model where the log of annual non-wage benefits and the log of annual 
money wage are the dependent variables. The explanatory variables 
described above are included in the regressions. The correlations and 
probability values of the tests are reported in Table 2. The Breusch-Pagan 
test of independence was rejected. The significant positive correlation of 
the residuals between money wages and non-wage benefits is about 0.6. 
The results of the SUR regressions
11 using the money wage and the total 
wage as the dependent variables, are shown in Table 3.
12 The woman 
dummy coefficient in the wage-level regressions without non-wage 
benefits is about -0.21. Comparing the woman dummy coefficients 
indicates that non-wage benefits decrease the gender gap, ceteris paribus. 
The returns on different educational levels increase and so do the 
coefficients of the experience variables and the returns on most other 
variables in the model. The separate regressions for women and men show, 
on the other hand, that for women the returns to the four lowest educational 
levels actually decrease when non-wage benefits are taken into account. 
For men, the return on every level increases beyond the reference level. 
To analyse whether these differences are significant, the hypothesis of 
equal coefficient vectors across equations is tested, using the SUR off-
diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix described above. The 
hypothesis of equal coefficient vectors (except for the constants) is rejected 
at the 5 per cent level and below. The χ
2-values for tests of the whole 
coefficient vector (except for the constant term) and of groups of 
coefficients, are shown in Table 4. The tests of the coefficient groups show 
that an inclusion of non-wage benefits do affect the returns.  
The equality between separate coefficients across the equations was also 
tested, to find out which variables generate the differences discussed above. 
Coefficients printed in bold italics in the Total Wage columns in Table 3 
show significant differences between the money-wage and the total-wage 
                                                            
11 No weights are used in the estimations.
 
12 The ”goodness of fit” measure R
2 is not quite appropriate in a GLS context. However, 
the reported R
2 values are calculated prior to combining the information across 
equations. In this case they are exactly identical to the R
2s from OLS regressions on the 
separate equations, so they are reported in quotation marks. Nonetheless, some possible 
alternative R
2 definitions for the SUR model are suggested. See, Judge et al., 1985, p. 
477.  
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coefficients. The woman dummy coefficient decreases in absolute value. 
This means that non-wage benefits in their capacity as insurance rights 
narrow the earnings gap.  
There also seem to be gender differences in the returns on education, but 
in the usual direction. In the case of men, every education level, except the 
lowest one, shows a significant increase in the average return beyond the 
basic level when non-wage benefits are included. This is not the case for 
women, when non-wage benefits are taken into account the only significant 
change due to non-wage benefits is a decrease in the return for women with 
a short upper secondary education.  
To get an impression of the "quantity" of the differences, the changes in 
returns are calculated.
13 The gender gap decreases by about 21 per cent due 
to non-wage benefits in their capacity as earnings-related insurance rights. 
The calculations show that, in the case of men, the average returns on the 
educational levels increase within a range of 25 to 37 per cent (average 31 
per cent) beyond the reference level due to non-wage benefits. The only 
significant change in the case of women refers to those with a short upper 
secondary education. The return on this educational level decreases by 
about 17 per cent. This means that the gender differences in returns to 
education are underestimated when money wage is used as the 
compensation measure in earnings regressions. 
The coefficients of the experience variables show significant changes 
due to non-wage benefits for both women and men. For women the 
increase is more than 100 per cent and for men about 57 per cent. 
Non-wage benefits significantly increase the earnings differentials for 
private and state white-collar employees compared to private blue-collar 
workers. The negative earnings gap between local authority and county 
council white-collar employees and private blue-collar workers widens 
even more due to non-wage benefits. This is in agreement with the 
principles underlying the construction of the insurance schemes. 
Non-wage benefits do not widen the earnings gap between employees 
living in the three biggest cities of Sweden and those living outside these 
cities. Women with children seem to be more punished concerning non-
wage benefits - the ”punishment” for having children gets larger. For men 
there is no significant effect of children. However, the significant marriage 
premium for men increases due to non-wage benefits. The increase in the 
male marriage premium is about 40 per cent. 
                                                            
13 When the coefficient exceeds 0.1, the percentage is measured as (exp[coefficient]-
1)*100. The change in returns due to non-wage benefits is calculated like this: For 
example, for men with a long university education (coefficients 0.439 and 0.528) the 
change is (0.695 - 0.551) / 0.551=0.261.  
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Table 3.   SUR regressions on a sample of employees, aged 20 to 60. 
Dependent variables: logarithm of annual money wage and loga-
rithm of annual total wage (money wage + non-wage benefits). Non-
wage benefits are old age pension rights, sickness benefit insurance 
rights and survivors' pension rights. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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level: 
      
Primary 
education, 
less than 9 
years 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Primary 
education 


























































































































        












Table 3 (cont.)  
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Table 3 (cont.) 
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No of children 


























        
# of 
observations 
10 897  10 897  5 517  5 517  5 380  5 380 
        
“R
2“    "0.485" "0.470" "0.410" "0.449" "0.381" "0.399" 
*Significant at 5 % level,  **significant at 1 % level 
Coefficients printed in bold  italics significantly differ from the corresponding 
coefficients in the money-wage equation according to the computed Wald tests. The 
hypothesis of equal coefficients is rejected at the 5 % level and below. R
2 is not well 
defined in the GLS context, so the values are reported in quotation marks. See footnote 
12 for further explanations.  
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Table 4.   χ
2-values for Wald tests of equal coefficient vectors 
across equations; equality between groups of coefficients and 
equality between the whole coefficient vector except for the 
constant term. 
  
Variables  All Female  Male 
      
Woman dummy (df=1)  118.0**     
Education dummies (df=6)  89.7**  24.0 **   83.9** 
Experience + exp
2 (df=2)
   822.9**  1750.0**  512.8** 
Full-time dummy (df=1)  0.0  0.3  2.6 
Sector/class dummies (df=5)  557.1**  521.9**  244.4** 
Big city  (df=1)  0.3  0.1  0.4 
Children (df=1)  6.7**   37.6**  4.5* 
Married (df=1)  27.8**   11.3**  8.8** 
All coefficients (df=18 / 17 / 17)  3336.8**   3003.6**  1117.7** 
*Significant at 5 % level,  **significant at 1 % level 
 
 
These results are much in line with a study of Granqvist (1998) on Finnish 
data, where the total value of conventional fringe benefits was included. 
Especially the pattern of the gender differences in returns to education 
seem to be identical; the differences for women were not significant except 
in one case, while every male difference was significant. This means that 
the gender differences in returns to education are underestimated when 
money wage is used as compensation measure in earnings regressions. 
The conclusion is that the exclusion of non-wage benefits in the 
traditional extended earnings equation, does bias the return on human 
capital. A change in the money wage is therefore not a good enough proxy 




VI. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have looked at the question as to whether or not the 
inclusion of non-wage benefits in their capacity as earnings-related 
insurance rights in the earnings equation changes the gender gap and 
returns on human capital. The tested H0-hypothesis states that omitting 
non-wage benefits from the wage equation does not bias the return on 
human capital, because a change in the money wage will be a good proxy  
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for the change in the total wage. The non-wage benefits included in the 
compensation measure were earnings-related old age pension rights, 
survivors’ pension rights and sickness benefit insurance rights. 
The conclusion is that the inclusion of non-wage benefits in the 
traditional extended earnings equation, does affect estimates of the return 
on human capital. A change in the money wage is therefore not a good 
enough proxy for the change in the total wage. 
The inclusion of earnings-related insurance rights in the earnings 
equation significantly decreases the gender gap, and increases the returns 
on education levels beyond the reference level for males. This is not the 
case for women. The only significant change is a decrease in the returns for 
women with a short upper secondary education. This means that the gender 
differences in returns to education are underestimated when money wage is 
used as compensation measure in earnings regressions. 
The gender gap narrows by about 21 per cent due to non-wage benefits. 
On average, the returns on different educational levels for men increase on 
average about 31 per cent due to non-wage benefits. In the case of women 
the only significant effect stemming from non-wage benefits appears for 
those with a short upper secondary education, where the decrease in return 
is 17 per cent.  
To sum up: the results of this paper indicate that money wage only is a 




Table A1. The 1995 rules in the earnings-related social insurance pension (ATP), 
the occupational pension for private blue-collar workers (STP), private white-collar 





















for local employees 








30 base amounts   30 base 
amounts 
30 base amounts 




















3 best annual 
wages between 
ages of 55 and 
59 





th best of 











10% of average 
of 3 best annual 
wages between 
ages of 55 and 
59 
10% on fractions of wage 
up to 7.5 base amounts, 
65% on fractions of wage 
between 7.5 and 20 base 
amounts, 32.5% on 
fractions of wage between 
20 and 30 base amounts. 
A minor defined 
contribution pension is 
added 
Same as in ITP  Pension is coordinated 
with national basic 
pension and ATP. It is 





th best final five 
annual wages. 
Compensation varies 
with income bracket 
Pensionable 
age 
65  65  65  65  Normally 65. For 
large occupational 
groups, e.g. within the 
health-care sector a 
lower pensionable age 
applies 
Note: The 1995 base amount is 35 700 SEK  
18 
 








for private blue-collar 
workers 
Occupational 





for state employees 
Occupational 
survivors’ 





On fractions of 
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below 7.5 base 
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Child pension: 




If the deceased’s 
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Until 20 years of 
age. 












Table A3.  The 1995 sickness benefit insurance rules. 
 








Day 1  No-benefit day  No-benefit day  No-benefit day  No benefit-day 
 
Day 2-14  Sick pay 
80 per cent of whole 
wage 
Sick pay 
80 per cent of whole 
wage 
Sick pay 
80 per cent of whole wage 
 
Sick pay 
80 per cent of 
whole wage 
Day 15-90  Social insurance: 
80 per cent on 
fractions of wages 





10 per cent on 
fractions of wages 
below 7.5 base 
amounts 
Social insurance: 
80 per cent on fractions 





10 per cent on fractions 
of wages below 7.5 
base amounts 
90 per cent on fractions 
of wages between 7.5 
and 30 base amounts. 
Social insurance: 
80 per cent on fractions of 





10 per cent on fractions of 
wages below 7.5 base 
amounts 
90 per cent on fractions of 
wages between 7.5 and 30 
base amounts. 
Social insurance: 
80 per cent on 
fractions of 





10 per cent on 
fractions of 
wages below 7.5 
base amounts 
90 per cent on 
fractions of 
wages between 
7.5 and 30 base 
amounts. 
 
Day 91 -  Social insurance: 
80 per cent on 
fractions of wages 




80 per cent on fractions 





65 per cent on fractions 
of wages between 7.5 
and 20 base amounts, 
32.5 per cent on 
fractions of wages 
between 20 and 30 base 
amounts. 
Social insurance: 
80 per cent on fractions of 





80 per cent on fractions of 
wages between 7.5 and 30 
base amounts. 
Social insurance: 
80 per cent on 
fractions of 





80 per cent on 
fractions of 
wages between 
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